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Abstract: We examine the returns to investors in publicly traded stock in new industries. We examine data 
from the United States on sellers of own-brand personal computers, airlines and airplane manufacturers, 
automobile manufacturers, railroads, and telegraphs. We find that a relatively small number of companies 
generate outstanding returns and many firms fail. Firms in new industries typically have high volatility of 
individual stocks’ returns. Compared with indexes for the same period, expected returns of firms are 
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INTRODUCTION
One thousand dollars invested in America Online’s IPO in March 1992 became
$295,545 by the end of 2000 when AOL was purchased by Time-Warner. This is
an extraordinary payoﬀ for shareholders — over ﬁve percent per month. While an
extraordinary return, new industries have high risk and their stocks are likely to have
high expected returns. On the other hand, the extraordinary behavior of dot-com
stocks make this conclusion less than obvious.
The stratospheric prices of dot-com stocks and returns to some shareholders suggest
that expected returns in a new industry may well be dominated by aspects of returns
not typical in more mature industries. One possibility is euphoria or craziness, an
explanation given more plausibility by the boom and bust in dot-com stock prices.
Another explanation is that such stocks are similar to options and lottery tickets.
This possibility has occurred to many observers, among them Alan Greenspan who
observed that “When you are dealing with stock the possibilities of which are either
i t ’ sg o i n gt ob ev a l u e da tz e r oo rs o m eh u g en u m b e r—y o ug e tap r e m i u mi nt h a t
stock price which is exactly the same sort of price evaluation process that goes on
in the lottery.” [Blumberg Capital 1999]. Perhaps stocks in new industries have a
distribution of returns that includes the possibility of large gains and small losses?
If so, then investors may buy stocks for the same reasons that people are willing to
1pay for lottery tickets. This explanation could be consistent with high valuations
and even negative expected returns because investors are willing to pay on average
to have a small probability of a large gain.
Indeed, the limited history of dot-coms suggests realization of substantial negative
returns. The average geometric return to shareholders across dot-coms is -4.3 percent
per month. Even so, the history of dot-coms probably is too short to deliver very
reliable evidence on the expected return in new industries. This average return to
stockholders is based on the same ﬁrms as in Hand [2001], but there are only ﬁve
ﬁrms in the CRSP data for these ﬁr m sa sr e c e n t l ya s1 9 9 5 .
We estimate expected returns in new industries by examining new industries with
longer experiences than dot-coms. Many analogies have been drawn between dot-
coms and earlier industries as far back as railroads and telegraphs, e.g. in Business
Week [Mandel 1999, Hof and Hamm 2002], the Economist [2000], Nairn [2002] and
Perez [2002].1 Among these analogies is the importance of network eﬀects. Network
eﬀects are important for dot-coms and they are important for some of the industries
examined in this paper. Some prior industries in this paper are network industries
if a network industry is deﬁned as one in which a standard for the product or the
availability of complementary inputs have high marginal value for the industry. One
of the industries included in the analysis in this paper is the automobile industry,
which standardized on gasoline engines instead of electricity or steam. In addition,
we examine the telegraph industry, for which interconnection is as crucial as for
the Internet. While it is less obvious, interconnection also is an important issue
for railroads as well. When diﬀerences in track width — gauge — are large enough,
connections across lines can require unloading and reloading railroad cars. Gauge
was not standardized in the U.S. until the 1880s and even today, gauge in Spain and
1On a longer time scale, Jensen [1993] draws lessons for what he calls the Third Industrial
Revolution since 1973 from earlier ones.
2Portugal is diﬀerent than in the rest of Europe.
In this paper, we examine the returns in major, new industries in the United
States and summarize the distribution of returns over the period of the industry’s
development. Our paper is related to recent papers by Fama and French [2001] and
Gompers and Lerner [2003.] Cochrane examines the distribution of returns to ﬁrms
ﬁnanced by venture capital and ﬁnds that their expected proportional returns are
quite high, on the order of 50 percent per year. Fama and French [2001] examine
the returns on newly-listed ﬁr m si nt h eC R S Pd a t a s e tf r o m1 9 2 6t o2 0 0 0a n dﬁnd
that these ﬁrms’ returns are similar to their benchmark returns. Gompers and Lerner
[2003] ﬁnd that returns on initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) before NASDAQ are similar
to their benchmark returns. Our paper is both narrower and broader than these
p a p e r s .O u rp a p e ri sn a r r o w e rb e c a u s ew ed on o te x a m i n et h er e t u r n st oi n v e s t o r si n
all new ﬁrms; we examine the returns only for ﬁrms in new industries. Our paper is
broader because we would have relatively few industries if we limited our analysis to
the CRSP dataset. We extend the data back before 1926 in order to obtain evidence
on more than just a couple of new, major industries. Our paper also is related to
Pástor and Veronesi’s [2005] analysis of technological revolutions and stock prices.
We do not develop or illustrate a particular theory, but we examine the distribution
of returns in several earlier industries using statistical analysis in a way that lets us
draw inferences about those returns.
In the ﬁrst section of the paper, we examine the distribution of returns in the
personal computer industry. The IBM PC was introduced in 1981 and detailed infor-
mation on this industry is readily available.
Next, we examine the distributions of returns in major new industries in earlier
time periods. We analyze the airline and aircraft industries, automobile production,
railroads and the telegraph industry. These industries are associated with major
changes in transportation and communications in the United States and had wide-
3spread eﬀects on the rest of the economy.2
We examine returns over the ﬁrst 15 or 20 years or so after an industry begins to
develop. This is long enough to be interesting but not so long as to require the implicit
assumption that investors at the beginning of an industry foresee developments a half
century or more later. Our analyses end at the start of major, largely unforeseen
disruptions such as wars or the Great Depression, disruptions that are not industry-
speciﬁc.
Our evidence shows that public investors can expect to receive returns on stocks
in new industries that are positive and broadly in line with market returns. Our
results are comparable in that respect to results found by Cochrane [2005], Fama and
French [2001] and Gompers and Lerner [2001]. The data show some evidence of small
probabilities of large gains and high probabilities of small losses, but they generally
are not dramatically inconsistent with a log-normal distribution’s implied skewness of
payoﬀs. Sharpe ratios indicate that portfolios of stocks in ﬁrms in new industries are
not an obvious bad deal, but such portfolios are dominated by diversiﬁed portfolios
spanning the market.
PERSONAL COMPUTERS
Personal computers have been around for more than a quarter of a century, so the
personal computer industry is an obvious one in which to examine the distribution of
stock returns. High returns are easy to see at a glance. Two well known ﬁrms have
2It is not hard to think of other industries that could be studied. For example, the telephone
industry had large eﬀects on communication, but it would not be very informative because its early
history is one of monopoly due to patents, followed by a short window of competition and then
overwhelming regulation [Weiman and Levin 1994]. The electric power industry is another obvious
candidate, but its evolution also was heavily aﬀected by patents and regulation. Other industries
such as the frozen pizza industry might well be interesting, but our results are more to the point if
the large majority of ﬁrms are startups that primarily do business in that industry.
4very high returns: Dell and Apple. One thousand dollars invested in Dell Computer
Corp. in June 1988 when it started trading on public exchanges became $256,922 by
the end of December 2006. This is an annual average proportional return on the order
of 35 percent per year for 18 and a half years. One thousand dollars invested in Apple
in December 1983 became $30,524 by December 2006. While less spectacular than
the payoﬀ to investors in Dell, this investment has an annual average return on the
order of 16 percent per year for over twenty years. While these ﬁrms are unlikely to
be typical, what are a typical investor’s returns from a new ﬁrm in the PC industry?
The Distribution of Returns
We use data from CRSP to estimate the distribution of returns to investors in
publicly traded ﬁrms that make own-brand personal computers.3 We compute rates
of return on all such ﬁrms. Table 1 provides a summary of the returns on those stocks.
These data are for ﬁrms in the personal computer industry, even though some ﬁrms
such as IBM do not receive their primary revenue from making PCs. The returns are
average proportional returns with annual compounding. The returns for the whole
period are from December 1983 through December 2006. If the whole period is not
available, we compute the return for the period for which market prices are available.
When a ﬁrm disappears from the CRSP ﬁles, we end the computations for the ﬁrm
even if the ﬁrm merged into another ﬁrm, as did Zeos into Micron. Because we
are attempting to measure returns, not duration of existence, this procedure seems
better than making choices linking payoﬀsa c r o s sﬁrms that will substantially aﬀect
subsequent returns. The numbers presented in the table make it relatively easy to
see the eﬀects of various treatments of ﬁrms disappearing. The choice of December
3We leave out UNIX personal computers because of their signiﬁcantly higher prices for computers
and software.
More details on the collection of data are available in the Data Appendix available on request.
51983 as a starting date is somewhat arbitrary. The ﬁrst personal computer generally
is acknowledged to be the MITS Altair introduced in 1974 [Ceruzzi 1998, p. 226], but
the introduction of the IBM PC in August 1981 and its subsequent commercialization
seem to us to be more important for the values of ﬁrms traded on organized exchanges.
These data show dramatically diﬀerent annual returns across the ﬁrms, and the
returns for the whole period vary substantially. The highest average annual return is
35.0 percent per year for Dell and the lowest is -77.7 percent per year for Diversiﬁed
Technologies, which does not appear in the CRSP ﬁles after February 1985. Dell,
Zeos, NCR, Compaq and Apple have positive returns that stand out. The average
return across stocks in Table 1, though, is an abysmal -9.1 percent per year, and this
is for a period when the return for the CRSP value-weighted and equally-weighted
indexes for all ﬁrms are 12.2 and 12.9 percent per year respectively. A cursory look
at these numbers and the average returns suggests that these stocks have quite low
returns.
As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent view appears, though, from looking at the cumulative values
from a dollar invested in each ﬁrm for the whole period with any dividends reinvested.
The table shows, for example, that one dollar invested in Dell in June 1988 has a
cumulative value of $256.92 in December 2006. A dollar invested in Hewlett Packard
in December 1983 has a value of $12.22 in December 2006. For 1983 through 2006,
the average across ﬁrms of the cumulative values from investing in these stocks is
$14.53, above the value-weighted CRSP index’s payoﬀ of $14.05 although less than
the equally-weighted CRSP index’s payoﬀ of $16.16. The average cumulative values
for subperiods show that a dollar invested in a portfolio of these ﬁrms provided payoﬀs
similar to or greater than the CRSP indexes in all periods except 1987 to 1991 and
1999 to 2003.
These cumulative values appear to tell a diﬀerent story than the returns. The
average of the cumulative values for the whole period for all stocks in companies
6producing PCs is $14.53, which is greater than the initial investment of a dollar. This
$14.53 can be interpreted as the amount received as a result of a strategy of investing
1/24 of a dollar in each of these PC ﬁrms when it enters our data set and selling at the
p r i c ea tt h ee n do ft h el a s tm o n t hf o rw h i c hw eh a v ed a t ao nt h eﬁrm. The assumed
return on the funds is zero when not invested in a PC company. The average annual
proportional return is -9.1 percent per year and the average of the cumulative values
for the PC companies is $14.53. How can a negative average return be consistent
with a ﬁnal payoﬀ over fourteen times greater than the initial investment?4
Payoﬀsa n dE x p e c t e dR e t u r n s
The seeming contradiction between this higher payoﬀ from investing in the PC
producers and the negative average returns is due to the diﬀerence between averaging








where Vi is the cumulative value for ﬁrm i,i =1 ,...,N, Ti is the number of periods
for which we have returns for ﬁrm i, μr is the mean return and we have used the fact






These two averages need not produce similar rankings and equation (1) can
have a negative solution while equation (2) has a solution greater than unity. The
basic problem is the nonlinear operation of taking a root to calculate the average
annual return for each ﬁrm.
Agents’ preferences are over ﬁnal consumption in any standard economic model, so
4Both averages are across ﬁrms.
7the cumulative values are more pertinent than average returns for comparing payoﬀs
relative to the market. Furthermore, by Jensen’s inequality, equation (1) will be less
than the expected return. In our case, this underestimation of the expected return
t u r n so u tt ob eq u i t el a r g e .
Besides this nonlinear diﬀerence between the averages, there is another problem
with the average annual return across ﬁrms. In that computation, each ﬁrm is
weighted the same whether it exists for one year or for all 23 years. In eﬀect, there
is a reverse survivor bias, an expiring bias. The return per year for the few years
that some ﬁr m se x i s th a st h es a m ew e i g h ti n( 1 )a st h er e t u r np e ry e a rf o rﬁrms that
exist for the whole period. If one is interested in the expected return in any given
month, the average returns across ﬁrms conditional on their existence would weight
each ﬁrm’s average return for the months that it exists by the number of months that
the ﬁrm is in existence relative to other ﬁrms.
What is a better way of estimating the expected return from the stocks? We sup-
pose that the expected return is constant across stocks since the interesting estimate
for our purpose is the distribution of returns not conditional on any information
about the individual ﬁrms. For simplicity, we also suppose that the expected value
and volatility are constant over time with a log-normal distribution of returns. It is
well known that a log-normal distribution of returns can cumulate into skewed dis-
tributions of values such as these in Table 1. It might seem that the assumption of
log-normality is grossly inconsistent with the evidence for stock markets, but much
of that evidence is for high-frequency time-series data conditional on prior returns.
In contrast, we are estimating the expected return across ﬁrms for a typical period
chosen at random, not a value for a speciﬁc period, say July 1992, conditional on
prior returns. The issue for our estimates is whether the simple model is seriously
at variance with the returns across ﬁrms, thereby suggesting that the estimated ex-
pected return is likely to be misleading. Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and
8Bera-Jarque tests are reported in the tables with the estimates; these tests generally
are consistent with the log-normal distribution being a reasonable characterization of
the cumulative values.
This suggests a simple underlying price dynamic given by standard Brownian mo-
tion,
dV (t)/V (t)=μdt + σdB(t), (3)
where V (t) i st h ec u m u l a t i v ev a l u ea tt, μ is the expected return, σ is the underlying
volatility of the return and B(t) is a standard Wiener process. Applying Ito’s lemma,




2)dt + σdB(t)=αdt + σdB(t) (4)
These equations indicate that
μ = α +( 1 /2)σ
2,
where α is the continuously compounded return. The maximum likelihood estima-
tors of these parameters are well known [Tsay 2002; Gourieroux and Jasiak 2001;













[rt − b α]
2 (6)
b μ = b α +( 1 /2)b σ
2, (7)
where rt = ∆lnVt, T =
PN
i=1 Ti and t =1 ,...,T.T h ei n d e xt runs all return-months,
so that an observation is the log return for a month for a ﬁrm.
We have data on returns monthly and the returns are most conveniently analyzed
at annual rates. The diﬀu s i o ne q u a t i o ni sdV (t)/V (t)=μhdt + σ
√
hdB(t) where h
is the time interval. For example, if returns and variances are measured at an annual
9frequency, data are available for 20 years and there are 240 observations because the
data are equally spaced monthly values over the twenty years, then h =2 0 /240 =
1/12. Data are available for diﬀerent lengths of time for the ﬁrms. There are ni
observations on ﬁrm i o v e rt h et i m ei n t e r v a lTi = Te
i − T
f
i +1 , which implies that
Ti = nih.T h es y m b o lT
f
i denotes the ﬁrst time period for which a return is available
and the symbol Te
i denotes the ending time period for which a return is available.






































t(h) denotes the return for ﬁrm i at frequency h a n dw eu s et h ef a c tt h a t
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The estimator of b μ is b μ = b α + b σ





























Given this simple setup, the expected return is straightforward to compute. For
personal computers, the mean of the log changes is -0.0301 per year and the maximum
likelihood estimate of σ2 is a quite high 0.3043 per year.5 The implied estimate of μ
is 0.1220. These numbers are summarized in the ﬁrst row of Table 1.
5Using all of the daily data on stock prices would have no eﬀect on the estimate of the average
return. Using all of the daily data on stock prices would increase the precision of the estimate of
the variance. We doubt that it would aﬀect the estimated variance in the ﬁrst one or two decimal
places, and it would make these computations non-comparable to the computations that are feasible
with earlier industries. As a result, we use monthly prices from the CRSP ﬁles.
10T h el a s tt w oc o l u m n si nt h eﬁrst row of Table 1 also present Kolmogorov-Smirnov
and Bera-Jarque test statistics for examining the adequacy of the log-normal distri-
bution for characterizing the distribution of ﬁnal cumulative values. The p-values of
these tests are 0.15 and 0.78, which suggests that the log-normal distribution is not
extremely inconsistent with the data.
How does this expected return compare with the CRSP indexes for the same period?
Using the values of the monthly equally-weighted CRSP index over the same period,
we estimate a mean of the log changes α of 0.1210 per year and a volatility σ2 of
0.0331. The implied estimate of μ is 0.1375 per year. Using the values of the monthly
value-weighted CRSP index over the same period, we estimate an expected return μ
of 0.1265 per year.
Our estimates indicate an expected return for PC stocks somewhat less than the
return for the market. The estimate of the expected return on stocks in PC ﬁrms is
about 12.2 percent per year. For the same period, the estimate of the market expected
return is about 13.8 percent for the equally-weighted CRSP index and 12.6 percent
per year for the value-weighted CRSP index. It is quite possible that investors in PC
ﬁrms received less than the risk-adjusted return on alternative investments. Many
ﬁr m si nt h eP Ci n d u s t r yd i db a d l ya n ds o m eﬁrms disappeared; the distribution of
cumulative values across ﬁrms shows a high probability of loss and some probability of
a large gain. In the last section of the paper, we examine the returns from a portfolio
of PC ﬁrms compared to returns from the market.
AIRLINES AND AIRPLANES
Table 2 shows the distribution of returns across the airline and airplane manufac-
turing industries. This table covers December 1925 to December 1940. December
1925 is the start of the CRSP data, which is our source for these data. These are
all of the identiﬁable airlines and airplane manufacturers in the CRSP data in this
11period.6 We use December 1940 as the last date to mitigate eﬀects of World War
II, which are likely to be extraordinary relative to the distribution of returns that
investors have in mind before the War. These data also span the Great Depression.
Making comparisons with the overall market ameliorates the eﬀects of developments
aﬀecting all stocks’ returns even if it does not completely suppress the eﬀect of the
Depression. We have data on both airlines and airplane manufacturing. We ana-
lyze airlines and airplane manufacturers separately because these two sets of ﬁrms
are quite diﬀerent even if they both arose from the commercialization of ﬂying in
heavier-than-air machines.
There is substantial dispersion in the distribution of cumulative values for the airline
industry in Table 2. There are no very large payoﬀs on the order of magnitude of
the PC industry though. Two ﬁrms — American Airlines and Eastern Airlines — have
very high annual average returns, but these ﬁrms exist only for brief periods toward
the end of the period. Four of the eleven airlines have cumulative values less than the
initial investment of a dollar. The average ﬁnal payoﬀ across all airlines is $1.19 from
an initial dollar invested, which is greater than the initial amount invested but less
than the payoﬀ of $2.49 from the equally-weighted CRSP index for the same period.
Over this period, the airplane manufacturing industry provides better returns for
investors than the airline industry. Only one of the ﬁve manufacturing ﬁrms has
ap a y o ﬀ less than the initial investment, and three of the ﬁve have annual returns
from 16 to 20 percent. There is no evidence of any exceptional payoﬀsi na i r p l a n e
manufacturing on the order of those received by owners of Dell stock though, even
though investors in Wright Aeronautical Aviation and Douglas Aircraft did well.
Returns from airlines and airplane manufacturing provide support for substantial
6Not all of the ﬁrms engaged exclusively in providing transportation services by plane. For
example, Philadelphia Rapid Transit provided local transit service in Pennsylvania and provided
airplane service between cities.
12dispersion in outcomes. At one extreme, an investor of $1 in Wright Aeronautical in
December 1925 received $9.67 in December 1940. At the other extreme, an investor
of $1 in Philadelphia Rapid Transit received $0.07 at the end of virtually the same
period.
The expected return to an investor in airlines in this period is 0.1753 per year.
The estimate of the mean of the log changes α is -0.0298 per year and the estimate
of the volatility σ2 is 0.4102 per year, ﬁgures comparable in magnitude to PCs. The
expected return to an investor in airplane manufacturing is quite a bit higher, 0.3316
per year. This estimate is based on an estimated mean of the log changes α of 0.0837
per year and an estimated volatility σ2 of 0.4957 per year.
For the CRSP indexes, the expected return is 0.1505 per year for the equally-
weighted index and 0.0782 for the value-weighted index. The diﬀerence between
these two diﬀerent indexes reﬂects a higher average growth rate and higher volatility
of the CRSP equally-weighted index.
The expected return from holding stock in an airline or airplane manufacturing
ﬁrm is greater than the expected return from holding an equally-weighted or value-
weighted market basket of stocks, contrary to the evidence for PCs.
AUTOMOBILES
Some investors in the automobile industry did enjoy extraordinary returns for part
of the twentieth century. Table 3 shows that investors in two companies in particular
did very well. One dollar invested in General Motors in 1912 was worth $12.72 by
1928. Investing the same amount in Packard in 1922 was worth $12.12 by 1928, which
is even better because the period is less than half as long.7
Table 3 presents the 22 companies for which we have dividend and stock price
7Ford also paid high dividends, but its stock price is not available because the stock was closely
held.
13information. The data are from contemporary periodicals.8 The returns for the whole
period are from December 1912 to December 1928. The data start in 1912 because
there is little information available on stock prices before 1912. The computations
e n di n1 9 2 8t oa v o i dt h ee ﬀects of the stock market crash and the Great Depression.
H o ww e l ld o e st h i ss a m p l eo ft w e n t yﬁrms represent the automobile industry over
this same period? From 1902 until the end of 1926, one estimate is that 181 diﬀerent
ﬁrms produced automobiles for some period.9 There was substantial turnover, with
estimates as high as 88 ﬁrms in one source to 272 ﬁrms in another source producing
automobiles in one year.10 Only 44 ﬁrms were producing automobiles by the end of
1926. The companies most left out of our sample are those whose stock did not trade
publicly, which means that the ﬁrms in our sample generally are among the most
prominent. An exception to this generalization is Ford Motor Company, which was
closely held and whose stock did not trade on an organized exchange.
The cumulative values received by investors in GM and Packard are exceptional,
not typical. Table 3 shows that the mean and median cumulative values for all
companies are $3.550 and $1.933. These ﬁgures can be compared to those for the
Cowles index for December 1912 to December 1928 [Cowles 1939]. The Cowles index is
t h eb e s tm a r k e ti n d e xa v a i l a b l ef o rt h i sp e r i o da n di sv a l u ew e i g h t e d .T h ec u m u l a t i v e
value for the Cowles index for 1912 to 1928 is $5.918, which is greater than either
the mean or median for the automobile industry. Only seven of the 22 automobile
m a n u f a c t u r e r sh a v ec u m u l a t i v ev a l u e sa sh i g ha st h eC o w l e si n d e x .I no v e rt w o - t h i r d s
of these companies, $1 invested earned a payoﬀ less than $5.92, the value of the same
investment in the overall market over this period.
8The sources for these and other data are in the Data Appendix.
9Seltzer [1928, p. 65, Table 5] shows the number of automobile companies and the number of
ﬁrms entering and exiting for each year from the end of 1902 to 1926.
10Seltzer’s [1928, p. 65] estimated maximum of 88 ﬁrms producing automobiles is in 1921. Klep-
per’s [2007, p. 87] estimate based on Smith [1968] of 272 ﬁrms is in 1909.
14T h er e t u r n si nt h i st a b l ev a r yw i d e l y .T h eh i g h e s ta n n u a la v e r a g er e t u r n sa r e7 3 . 1
percent per year for Stutz for the brief period from September 1916 to March 1920 and
50.7 percent per year for Packard from November 1922 to December 1928. General
Motors has an annual average return of 17.2 percent for the 16 year period. The
lowest return is -15.4 percent for Nash Motor for July 1922 to December 1928.
The expected return to an investor in this sample of automobile companies in this
period is a rather high 0.3101 per year. As for the other industries, a relatively high
volatility is an important component of this estimate: the estimate of the volatility
σ2 is 0.4180 per year, although the average log change is a non-negligible 0.1011 per
year. This expected return of 0.3101 is similar to the expected return of 0.3316 for
airplane manufacturers. The expected return to an investor in the Cowles index over
the same period is 0.1207 per year, quite a bit lower than the return for automobile
companies.
RAILROADS
The railroad industry expanded rapidly, fueled at least in part by stock oﬀerings.
Table 4 presents our data for railroads traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). The data on stock prices and dividends are from contemporary periodicals.
We compare railroad returns to returns based on the equally-weighted index with
dividends reinvested compiled by Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng [2001].
There is a wide dispersion in proportional returns across ﬁrms, ranging from a high
of 51.6 percent per year to a low of -73.9 percent per year. The estimated expected
return for an investor in these railroads is 0.0982 per year. This expected return
is signiﬁcantly lower than in the later industries examined in this paper, and the
volatility of 0.1583 percent is roughly half these other industries’ volatilities.
Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng [2001] construct an equally-weighted market index
for the NYSE that can be used to estimate the expected return for the overall markets.
15For the period covered by the NYSE railroads, 1850 to 1870, the estimated expected
return on this index is 0.1831 per year. This expected return is due mostly to the
mean log return of 0.1416 per year with a smaller contribution by the volatility of
0.0830. The expected return on the market is twice the expected return for railroad
stocks.
THE TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY
The telegraph has been cited as the forerunner of the Internet, e.g. by Standage
[1999]. The telegraph network is a network in which interconnections are paramount,
interconnections that ultimately were associated with dramatic consolidation into
the Western Union [Thompson 1947]. The telegraph had dramatic eﬀects on the U.S.
economy in the 1830s and later [Garbade and Silber 1978], but an extensive search
of New York periodicals and historical monographs did not turn up a price for a
trade on an exchange before August 18, 1865. Virtually all of the consolidation in
the telegraph industry into the Western Union monopoly had occurred by 1865, so
this is too late for an analysis of the distribution of returns across ﬁrms. We do have
suﬃcient information to calculate returns for Western Union. We also have evidence
on dividends, which were more important in the middle 1800s than in the late 1900s
[Baskin and Miranti 1997]. These dividends suggest that some investors in ﬁrms
besides Western Union also did quite well.
Western Union stockholders clearly did well. A dollar invested in Western Union
at incorporation in April 1851 was worth $1,816.75 at the end of 1865.11 This is an
annual average proportional return of 28 percent per year for almost 14 years. While
not quite as spectacular as Dell’s return of 35 percent per year, 28 percent is quite
11Western Union did not pay cash dividends until the 1860s, so this simpliﬁes the calculations.
We assume that the reinvestment of cash dividends occurs at the par value. The par value is $50
and the price is $51 at the end of 1865.
16high relative to market returns in this period. What did investors in other ﬁrms
receive?
Available data indicate that investors in some telegraph companies received sub-
stantial returns. Nontrivial dividends were a substantial part of those returns. The
Magnetic Telegraph Company paid 12 percent “quite regularly”.12 The Atlantic
& Ohio Telegraph Company paid a dividend of 18 percent shortly after incorpo-
ration and generally 12 percent per year afterwards.13 The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati &
Louisville Telegraph Company paid a dividend of 11 percent in the year in which it
was incorporated and generally 12 percent per year thereafter.14 These high dividend
rates relative to par value do not imply high dividend rates relative to market value,
but the common complaint that stock prices generally were less than par value sug-
gests dividend rates relative to market value were even higher.15 While it is likely that
these dividends are mentioned because they are startling and not everyday values, an
inference that some ﬁrms had high returns seems well supported. Returns were not
12The Magnetic Telegraph Company built a line from New York to Philadelphia in 1845. Magnetic
was acquired by American Telegraph Company shortly after October 1859. Magnetic Telegraph
Company’s dividend payments in early years on the par value of stock were 1848, 6 percent; 1849, 9
percent; 1850 and 1851, 2 percent; 1852, 9 percent; 1853 and 1854, 13 percent; and 12 percent was
“paid quite regularly” thereafter. [Thompson 1947, p. 42, p. 331, p. 195].
13The Atlantic & Ohio Telegraph Company was incorporated in March 1847 and later acquired.
During its life, the Atlantic & Ohio paid dividends of 18 percent in 1848 and generally 3 percent per
quarter thereafter [Thompson 1947, p. 99, p. 296, p. 137].
14The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & Louisville Telegraph Company also was established in February
1848 and was consolidated with the Western Union in 1856. During its existence, this line paid
dividends of 11 percent in 1848 and generally 3 percent per quarter thereafter. [Thompson 1947, p.
121, pp. 292-93, p. 137].
15Issuing suﬃcient stock that the price was noticeably less than the par value was called “watering”
the stock, which meant watering down the value of the stock by issuing more shares than suggested
by the par value. While an automatic inference from railroads to telegraphs clearly is unwarranted,
railroad stock generally traded at less than par value even with substantial dividends.
17uniformly high; Thompson [1947] documents failed telegraph lines.
These dividend rates are high compared to contemporaneous interest rates on gov-
ernment securities, which are on the order of ﬁve and six percent per year. [Dwyer,
Hafer and Weber 1999]. These dividend returns also are high relative to the total
returns on the market index for this period [Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng 2001].
In sum, some telegraph ﬁrms clearly had high returns. A precise estimate of the
expected return for a typical ﬁrm is not possible with the available data, but the
available evidence does not point to a low expected return for investors in telegraph
companies.
PORTFOLIOS OF STOCKS IN THESE NEW INDUSTRIES
Given the high expected return and the high volatility of returns, it is not obvious
whether portfolios of stocks in these industries would be attractive portfolios. We
construct an equally-weighted portfolio for each industry. This is not a realizable
portfolio for a representative investor in the sense that not all investors can hold this
portfolio in equilibrium, but market-value weights are not available for most of the
industries.
The Sharpe ratio is an obvious way to examine the attractiveness of these port-
folios. It is clear that these ﬁrms provide much more volatile payoﬀs than holding
the overall market, and in general, this higher volatility must be compensated by a
higher portfolio return. What is the risk-return tradeoﬀ comparing the industry and
the overall market? If the risk-return tradeoﬀ is better for the overall market than
for the less diversiﬁed industry portfolio, then clearly holding the market dominates a
portfolios of stocks in these industries. The Sharpe ratio measures the excess return
over the risk-free rate per unit of risk. The Sharpe ratio for a portfolio of ﬁrms in an
industry can be compared to the Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio. The Sharpe
18ratio (SR) is estimated by
SR =
b μp − μf
b σp
(12)
where b μp is the estimated annual expected return on a portfolio of stocks, b σp is the
estimated standard deviation of the expected return and μf is the average annual
return for a one-period risk-free asset.
Table 5 presents the Sharpe ratios for all the industries and the Sharpe ratio for
market indexes for the same periods. The Sharpe ratio for the industry portfolio is
less than the Sharpe ratio for the overall market in the same period for all industries
except for airplane manufacturing. In the context of CAPM, this means that the
market portfolio dominates the industry portfolio given the possibility of borrowing
or lending unlimited amounts at the risk-free rate.
This does not deny, of course, that a prudent investor would hold at least some of
these stocks as part of a market portfolio.
RETURNS OVER TIME
The hypothesis of constant expected returns over the early development of indus-
tries is informative for summarizing that development. Still, a more detailed view
of the industries’ developments is possible. Much can be made of the evolution of
expected returns over time, either in terms of industry development, divergences of
stock prices from fundamental values, or both.
Figure 1 shows sequential ﬁve-year expected returns for all of the industries. As
are expected returns above, these returns equal the average logarithmic return plus
one-half of the variance. The ﬁrst ﬁve years of data are not represented for each
industry. The horizontal line in each ﬁgure is the expected return for the whole
period. The dashed line in each ﬁgure is zero expected return. This is a useful
benchmark when examining the ﬁgure even if a negative expected return is not a
19very sensible benchmark in some respects. These estimates of expected return are, of
course, serially dependent by construction, just as coeﬃcients in rolling regressions are
serially dependent. That serial dependence is no reason to think that the evolution
of the returns does not summarize average returns over time and is an implausible
indicator of expected returns over time.
With the exception of automobiles, there is an apparent pattern to these returns.
The early returns are low, the middle returns tend to be well above average and the
returns in the ends of these periods tend to be low again. Each of the industries has
some estimates of expected return that are negative. Both airlines and railroads have
sustained periods with negative estimates of expected returns.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Adjusted for risk, expected returns are not particularly high for ﬁrms in new in-
dustries.
Our evidence is consistent with new industries having distributions of payoﬀsa c r o s s
ﬁrms that are highly skewed. In this sense, new industries are similar to lotteries. As
is well known though, this can be quite consistent with a log-normal distribution and
our data across ﬁrms generally are consistent with a log-normal distribution of the
cumulative values across ﬁrms.
Our evidence uniformly indicates that the expected return to owners of traded stock
in new industries is positive and substantial. This is consistent with a supposition
that investors receive expected returns that can be interpreted as compensation for
the risk they bear. We do not address whether that compensation is consistent with
a model of market equilibrium at the level of individual ﬁrms.
The Sharpe ratios for these industries, though, indicate that a portfolio of stocks
in these new industries is dominated by the market portfolio. It pays to hold stocks
in new industries, but no more or less than it pays to hold other stocks.
20While investors generally are averse to risk, many interpret prices of stocks asso-
ciated with the Internet as being inconsistent with traditional asset pricing models.
Some have interpreted the behavior of prices in new industries as being consistent
with bubbles in those industries. Our data alone cannot really answer that question.
Any theory, rather than just a supposition, will imply more than just price increases
and decreases, with the theory likely to include variables such as volume and volatil-
ity (Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). Obtaining the additional data to test this theory
and similar ones with our data is likely to be a challenge, but a potentially extremely
informative one.
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Table 1.
  Personal Computer Companies and Stock Cumulative Values































Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1983-1987 1987-1991 1991-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2006
CRSP Value-Weighted Index 0.1218 14.0473 1.5952 1.8950 1.6386 2.4189 0.8319 1.4094
CRSP Equal-Weighted Index 0.1286 16.1592 1.0976 1.5790 1.9894 1.8403 1.6681 1.5268
Average -0.0907 14.5331 1.5872 0.9754 1.7475 5.8287 0.6201 1.8914
Median -0.0108 0.8505 1.3499 0.7171 1.1606 2.5521 0.4650 0.7384
Standard Deviation 0.2779 52.2216 1.3452 1.0509 1.5724 11.7987 0.4913 2.7104
Company
Dell Computer Corporation Jun-88 0.3498 256.9216 2.7333 4.0537 47.1336 0.6663 0.7384
Zeos International Sep-89 Mar-95 0.2075 2.8209 4.2985 0.6562
NCR Corporation Aug-91 0.1997 4.0392 2.1672 1.8638
Compaq Computer Apr-02 0.1916 24.8841 4.4300 0.9526 5.4597 2.8356 0.3809
Apple Computers Incorporated 0.1602 30.5241 3.4636 1.3962 0.5929 3.2255 0.4157 7.9401
Canon Incorporated Dec-97 0.1207 4.9291 1.2977 1.7874 1.6478 1.2896
Hewlett Packard Company 0.1150 12.2241 1.4040 1.0121 3.0823 2.8152 0.5328 1.8608
IBM 0.0749 5.2609 1.0784 0.9141 1.1524 4.8691 0.8803 1.0804
Digital Equipment Corporation May- 0.0300 1.5313 3.7500 0.4093 1.1606 0.8597
Advanced Logic Research Apr-90 Jun-97 0.0204 1.1557           0.7170 0.6316 2.5521
NEC Corporation -0.0003 0.9932 2.6366 0.6730 1.3167 2.0516 0.3164 0.6548
Inmac Corporation Oct-86 Dec-95 -0.0004 0.9962 1.4020 0.1921 3.7000
Unisys Corporation -0.0211 0.6125 2.3282 0.1384 1.3333 5.8068 0.4650 0.5280 Table 1 (Cont’d)
  Personal Computer Companies and Stock Cumulative Values
1983 through 2006
Individual Companies
Company Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1983-1987 1987-1991 1991-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2006
Intergraph Corporation Sep-00 -0.0571 0.3734 1.2857 0.7172 0.8873 0.2976 1.5333
ACT Networks Incorporated May-95 Jul-00 -0.0647 0.7078 0.8247 0.5866 1.4631
Gateway Incorporated Dec-93 -0.0663 0.4097 1.2484 11.7653 0.0638 0.4370
Televideo Systems Mar-99 -0.2467 0.0133 0.0748 0.1316 4.4000 0.3068
Compudyne Corporation Feb-91 -0.3174 0.0648 2.1296 0.0304
Micron Electronics Apr-95 Jul-01 -0.3306 0.0814 0.7611 1.0349 0.1034
Tandon Corporation Feb-93 -0.3800 0.0125 0.0844 0.8148 0.1818
Wells American Corporation Nov-90 -0.4494 0.0170 0.1864 0.0909
CPT Corporation Jul-90 -0.4615 0.0170 0.1456 0.1167
Everex System Incorporated Jul-87 Dec-92 -0.4746 0.0306 0.5306 0.5192 0.1111
Diversified Technologies Feb-85 -0.7767 0.1739 0.1739
Notes:
The data for Individual Companies show the distribution of payoffs on personal computer (PC) companies from December 1983 to December 2006.  The first and second columns after the name of the company
indicate the years for which stock prices are available, with blanks indicating that the dates are the default ones of December 1983 or December 2006 or both. For example, Dell Computer first appears in the
CRSP data in June 1988 and still exists in December 2006. The third column shows the annual average proportional return.  The fourth column shows the terminal value an investor would have starting with
a dollar invested in the firm with all dividends reinvested.  The remaining columns show the terminal value for a dollar invested in the firm for each of the periods indicated. When data for a firm begins after
the beginning of a period, the value in the table for the period starts when data become available. When data for a firm ends before the ending date of a period, the value in the table is the value for the last month
that the stock price appears in the CRSP files. The subperiods shown are for four-year periods, with the exception of December 2003 through December 2006. The cumulated values are shown for December
1999 through December 2003 as well as for December 2003 through December 2006, which makes it easy  to see the effects of the crash in prices in 2000.
The information on the Expected Return shows the estimated expected return for PC companies, , the average log return m, the variance of the log return  and two tests for log normality. 2 (1/ 2) m μ σ =+ 2 σ
The standard deviations of estimated parameters other than the variance of the log return are under the estimated parameters.  The numbers under the variance of the log return are the 95 percent confidence
limits because the variance has a chi-square distribution, which is not symmetric.  The test statistics are the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied to a log-normal and the Bera-Jarque test. The associated p-values
of the test statistics are in parentheses under the test statistics. The last two columns show the expected return for the CRSP value-weighted and equally-weighed indexes for December 1983 to December 2006.Table 2 Continued on Next Page
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Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1925-1928 1928-1932 1932-1936 1936-1940
CRSP Value-Weighted Index 0.0302 1.5620 2.0301 0.3087 3.1500 0.7914
CRSP Equal-Weighted Index  0.0626 2.4868 1.8783 0.2614 7.0284 0.7208
Average 0.0523 1.1935 1.1891 0.3797 2.3109 1.3070
Median 0.0138 1.1613 1.1891 0.1711 2.2062 1.1798
Standard Deviation 0.2845 0.8004 0.5288 1.0343 0.6557
Airline Companies
American Airlines Incorporated Jun-39 0.6878 2.1926 2.1926
Eastern Airlines Incorporated Nov-38 0.5053 2.3443 2.3443
Transcontinental and Western Air Mar-35 0.1536 2.2742 2.9786 0.7635
Consolidated Aircraft Incorporated Jul-37 0.0883 1.3351 1.3351
National Aviation Corporation Dec-33 0.0286 1.2185 1.4852 0.8205
Aviation Corporation Jan-30 0.0138 1.1613 1.3171 1.1429 0.7715
Pan American Airways Dec-38 0.0122 1.0245 1.0245
United Aircraft & Transportation May-29 -0.0300 0.7027 0.2291 1.7171 1.7864
Bendix Aviation Corporation May-29 -0.0381 0.6376 0.1468 2.6954 1.6116
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Oct-39 -0.1782 0.0663 1.1891 0.0345 3.8460 0.4200
National Air Transport May-29 Mar-32 -0.4638 0.1711 0.1711Table 2 (Cont’d).
Airline and Airplane Companies and Stock Cumulative Values
1925 through 1940
Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1925-1928 1928-1932 1932-1936 1936-1940
Average 0.1091 4.2026 11.4176 0.3008 6.2584 1.1456
Median 0.1633 2.9207 11.4176 0.2561 4.5082 1.2558
Standard Deviation 0.1203 3.6096 0.2735 3.8061 0.3434
Airplane Manufacturers
Douglas Aircraft Incorporated Jun-31 0.2015 5.7217 0.6192 7.3578 1.2558
Boeing Airplane Corporation Sep-34 0.1871 2.9207 4.5082 0.6479
Wright Aeronautical Aviation 0.1633 9.6682 11.4176 0.0719 12.4405 0.9466
North American Aviation Apr-30 0.0838 2.3591 0.4386 3.7760 1.4245
Curtiss Aeroplane & Aug-29 -0.0900 0.3432 0.0736 3.2098 1.4529
Manufacturing
Note:
This table shows the distribution of payoffs on airlines and airplane manufacturers from December 1925 through December 1940. The notes to Table 1 explain the layout of the table.Table 3 Continued on Next Page
Table 3.





Mean Log Return Variance of Log Return Expected Return for
Cowles Index















Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Entire Period 1912-1916 1916-1920 1920-1924 1924-1928
Cowles Value-Weighted Index 0.1176 5.9183 1.3332 0.9218 1.8960 2.5399
Average 0.1312 3.5504 3.2289 1.5418 2.5386 2.5093
Median 0.1382 1.9327 1.0283 0.7686 1.5070 1.7403
Standard Deviation 0.2072 3.8517 5.2102 2.9538 3.7492 2.5118
Company
Stutz Motor Car Company Sept. 1916 Mar. 1920 0.7309 6.8222 0.6912 9.8704
Packard Motor Car Company Nov. 1922 0.5071 12.1249 1.0290 11.7829
Dodge Brothers May 1925 Nov. 1928 0.3037 2.5301 2.5301
Hudson Motor Jun. 1922 0.2968 5.4148 2.0992 2.5795
Hupp Motor Car Company Jan. 1920 0.2717 8.5273 0.7668 2.0112 5.5276
Maxwell Class B Dec. 1914 Jul. 1925 0.2152 7.8667 3.1666 0.0474 16.0006 3.2778
Reo Motor Car Company Dec. 1927 0.2118 1.2118 1.2118
Maxwell Class A Jun. 1921 Jul. 1925 0.1875 2.0170 1.3788 1.4630
Continental Motors Dec. 1922 0.1728 2.6015 0.8487 3.0653
General Motors 0.1723 12.7217 15.8767 0.0277 6.4856 4.4589
Gardner Motor Apr. 1923 0.1436 2.1392 0.5116 4.1819
Studebaker Corporation 0.1382 7.9290 2.7949 0.7704 1.5070 2.4438
Chrysler Motor Jul. 1925 0.0847 1.3200 1.3200
Jordan Motor Company Mar. 1924 0.0581 1.3075 1.9587 0.6675
White Motor Company Stock Oct. 1916 0.0556 1.9327 0.8893 1.0482 2.7470 0.7549
Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company Jun. 1917 -0.0129 0.8614 0.6067 0.7038 2.0176Table 3 (Cont’d).
Automobile Companies and Stock Cumulative Values
1912 through 1928
Company Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Entire Period 1912-1916 1916-1920 1920-1924 1924-1928
Moon Motors Aug. 1922 -0.0314 0.8169 2.2606 0.3613
Chandler Motor Feb. 1916 -0.0385 0.6040 1.1674 1.0421 0.8411 0.5903
Paige-Detroit Motor Car Company Apr. 1925 Dec. 1927 -0.0397 0.8976 0.8976
Kelly-Springfield Motor Truck Co. Mar. 1916 –0.0492 0.5255 0.8653 1.0500 0.4246 1.3624
Willys-Overland Motor Car Co. Feb. 1915 -0.0574 0.4418 0.3801 0.1888 1.9091 3.2257
Peerless Truck and Motor Oct. 1926 -0.1498 0.7036 0.7035
Nash Motor Jul. 1922 -0.1535 0.3432 0.4394 0.7809
Note:
This table shows the distribution of payoffs on automobile companies from December 1912 to December 1928.  The underlying data are monthly stock prices from the New York Times and dividends
from Moody’s.  The notes to Table 1 explain the layout of the table.Table 4.














NYSE Railroads 0.0982 0.0190 0.1583 0.1831 0.2191 84.2323
0.0224 0.0222 0.1514    0.1656 0.0662 (<0.0100) (<0.0001)
Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1851-1855 1855-1860 1860-1865 1865-1870
Goetzmann et al. Equally-Weighted Index (Annual
Data)
0.1522 14.7460 1.2600 3.3813 3.3170 1.0435
Average 0.0166 1.7414 1.0324 0.7151 3.5002 1.1100
Median 0.0245 1.1644 1.0275 0.6827 2.0642 1.0611
Standard Deviation 0.1945 2.4433 0.3164 0.4699 4.2539 0.4114
Company
Milwaukee and Prairie Du Chien Jul-61       Feb-66 0.5162 6.7368 6.7368 1.0000
St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Dec-62 Apr-70 0.3609 9.5809 4.1097 2.3313
Albany and Schenectady Oct-51 Jun-53 0.2865 1.5218 1.5218
Utica and Schenectady Jun-53 0.2522 1.4822 1.4822
Rochester and Syracuse Jun-53 0.2480 1.4737 1.4737
Rochester, Lockport and Niagra Falls Apr-52 May-53 0.2447 1.2676 1.2676
New York and Harlem Jan-56 0.2071 16.5807 0.9408 19.6552 0.8967
Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne and Chicago Aug-62 Aug-69 0.2068 3.7270 2.5982 1.4345
Long Island Jul-54 0.1696 1.5587 1.5587
Table 4 Continued on Next PageTable 4 (Cont’d)
Railroads Traded on the New York Stock Exchange and Stock Cumulative Values
Sept 1851-Dec 1870
Individual Companies
Company Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1851-1855 1855-1860 1860-1865 1865-1870
Chicago and Northwestern Jan-63  0.1644 3.3370 1.5652 2.1320
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Jan-60 Dec-67 0.1520 3.0645 1.6250 1.6113 1.1704
Milwaukee and St. Paul Preferred Jan-68  Dec-69 0.1477 1.3022 1.3022
Reading Dec-55 0.1395 1.7417 1.7417
Syracuse and Utica         Apr-53 0.0828                  1.1341 1.1341
Cleveland and Pittsburg Jan-53 0.0818 4.0912 0.7129 0.3808 12.3036 1.2250
Hannibal and St. Joseph Jan-68 0.0764 1.2396 1.2396
Milwaukee and St. Paul Feb-66   0.0707 1.3917 1.3917
Stonington        Nov-55 0.0530 1.2402 1.2402
New York Central and Hudson River Nov-69 0.0516 1.0560 1.0560
Chicago and Northwestern Preferred Jan-68 Dec-69 0.0495 1.0970 1.0970
Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne and Chicago Guaranteed Aug-69 0.0493 1.0662 1.0662
Delaware, Lackwanna and Western Jan-60 0.0473 1.6558 1.4815 1.1343 0.9853
Chicago and Alton Jul-63   0.0454 1.3897        1.2678 1.0962
Hudson River Nov-69 0.0447 2.2143 0.4393 1.4634 2.4056 1.4319
Toledo, Wabash and Western Feb-66  0.0445 1.2344 1.2344
New Jersey Nov-51 Dec-55 0.0380 1.1645 0.1645
Galena and Chicago Union Feb-53 May-64 0.0272 1.3520 1.2020 0.5522 2.0370
New York Central May-53 Nov-69 0.0262 1.5320 0.8236 0.8395 1.2614 1.7565
Illinois Central Jan-53 0.0259 1.5795 1.0290 1.4871 1.0323
Illinois Central Scrip Jan-56 Sept-64 0.0253 1.2421 0.7895 1.5733
Chicago and Rock Island May-54 Jun-69 0.0237 1.4226 1.0267 0.6100 2.0914 1.0862
Michigan Southern Dec-51 Apr-55 0.0228 1.0779 1.0779
New Haven and Hartford Oct-51 Oct-55 0.0188 1.0773 1.0773
Sixth-Avenue Dec-52 Oct-55 0.0172 1.0494 1.0494
Michigan Central Feb-52 0.0171 1.3760 1.0275 0.4866 2.2650 1.2150
Erie Railway Jul-61   0.0152 1.1530 4.0000 0.2883
Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana May-55 May-69 0.0113 1.1698 0.8979 0.1589 5.1466 1.5930
Cleveland and Toledo Oct-53 Mar-69 0.0111 1.1861 0.7917 0.4351 3.6290 0.9489
Philadelphia and Reading Jan-56  0.0103 1.1643 0.4222 3.1195 0.8840
Morris and Essex Jan-69   0.0090 1.0172 1.0172
North Indiana Mar-52 Apr-55 -0.0044 0.9866 0.9867
Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati Dec-52 Jun-68 -0.0057 0.9157 0.8512 0.8610 1.5156 0.8244
New York and New Haven        Jun-67 -0.0120 0.8276 0.7736 1.0702
Rome and Waterton Jan-53 Oct-55 -0.0137 0.9629 0.9629
Ohio and Mississippi Jun-63  -0.0179 0.8731 0.8808 0.9913
Central Railroad of New Jersey Jan-66 -0.0225 0.8941 0.8941
Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati and Indianapolis Jul-68 -0.0465 0.8913 0.8913
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Jul-69  -0.0484 0.9322 0.9322
Little Miami Jan-53 Nov-55 -0.0497 0.8656 0.8656
Norwich and Wor Aug-55 -0.0534 0.8066 0.8066
Table 4 Continued on Next PageTable 4 (Cont’d)
Railroads Traded on the New York Stock Exchange and Stock Cumulative Values
Sept 1851-Dec 1870
Individual Companies
Company Date Cumulative Value ($)
First Last Annual Return Entire Period 1851-1855 1855-1860 1860-1865 1865-1870
Dubuque and Sioux City Jul-69   -0.0720 0.8995 0.8995
Erie Railroad         Dec-55 -0.0825 0.6935 0.6935
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Jun-69   -0.1023 0.8506 0.8506
Madison and Ind Oct-51 Sept-54 -0.1066 0.7198 0.7198
New York and Erie Jan-56 Jul-61 -0.1317 0.4601 0.7555 0.6090
Harlem Dec-55 -0.2014 0.3846 0.3846
Boston, Hartford and Erie Jul-68   -0.3273 0.3836 0.3836
Columbus, Chicago and Indiana Central Jan-69  -0.4580 0.3092 0.3092
Milwaukee and Mississippi Nov-55 Jun-59 -0.6028 0.0366 1.2195 0.0300
Lacrosse and Milwaukee Jul-56 Dec-58 -0.7388 0.0390 0.0390Table 5.
Sharpe Ratios for Industry Portfolios
Industry Dates Industry 
Sharpe Ratio
Market Equally Weighted 
Sharpe Ratio
Market Value Weighted 
Sharpe Ratio
PCs December 1983 to December 2006 0.4516 0.4780 0.5014
Airlines December 1925 to December 1940 0.1949 0.3627 0.2083
Airplane Manufacturers December 1925 to December 1940 0.5443 0.3627 0.2083
Autos December 1912 to December 1928 0.4821 – 0.6392
NYSE Railroads September 1851 to December 1870 0.0084 1.1256 –
Notes: The market indexes are the CRSP market indexes for PCs, airlines and airplane manufacturers. The market index for autos is the Cowles index, which is not available



















Expected Return Over Time Across Industries
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